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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Standard of Review 
Interpretation of documentary language is a question of law. The Supreme 
Court need not defer to the lower court's construction; rather, the Court is free to 
make its own independent interpretation. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 
(Utah 1986). This standard applies to all issues. 
Issues for Review 
a. Does the presumption against intestacy allow a court to disregard the 
language of a will? 
b. Does making a will evidence an unassailable intent to die testate, and 
create such a strong presumption against intestacy that a Court must 
find the decedent testate? 
c. May a will which refers to real and personal property as separate and 
distinct categories dispose of the real property without mentioning the 
realty in any dispositive provision? 
d. May a court ignore an internal reference in a will to the fact that its 
dispositive provisions do not reach all the testator's property? 
e. Does Utah recognize the doctrine of equitable conversion in wills? 
f. May a will effect an equitable conversion of real estate and dispose of 
it as personal property without a specific direction that the property 
must be sold? 
g. Does a statement in a will that a person is not provided for therein 
prevent the person from receiving an intestate share? 
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h. Does the Will dispose of the decedent's real property? 
i. Does the Will dispose of the residue of personal property left after 
specific bequests, or does it merely dispose of personal effects? 
SIGNIFICANT STATUTES 
No statutes are determinative of this appeal. However, statutes of 
significance include: 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-101: 
Any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed of by his 
will passes to his heirs as prescribed in the following sections of this 
code. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-101: 
The power of a person to leave property by will and the rights of 
creditors, devisees, and heirs to his property are subject to the 
restrictions and limitations contained in this code to facilitate the 
prompt settlement of estates. Upon the death of a person his real and 
personal property devolves to persons to whom it is devised by his 
last will or to those indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving 
lapse, renunciation, or other circumstances affecting the devolution of 
testate estate, or in the absence of testamentary disposition, to his 
heirs, or to those indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving 
renunciation or other circumstances affecting devolution of intestate 
estates, subject to homestead allowance, exempt property and family 
allowance, rights of creditors, elective share of the surviving spouse, 
and administration. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-603: 
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal 
effect of his dispositions. The rules of construction expressed in the 
succeeding sections of this part apply unless a contrary intention is 
indicated by the will. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a Petition to determine whether the decedent's Will 
effectively disposed of his entire estate and to determine heirs of the estate. 
Course pf Proceedings 
Ryan W. Scarritt filed a Petition July 12, 1991, to declare that his father died 
partially intestate and that he was, as one of two sons, entitled to an intestate share. 
The Personal Representative replied to the Petition on August 15, 1991. No other 
party replied to the Petition. 
The Petition was heard by the lower court on the basis of oral argument, 
without presentation of evidence, on August 22, 1991. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
On September 5, 1991, the Fifth Judicial District Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision stating the Will effectively disposed of all of the decedent's 
estate. On September 25, 1991, an Order to that effect was entered. These orders 
are contained in the Addendum. 
These orders were certified as final under Rule 54(b), U.R.Civ.P. A copy of 
the certification order is in the Addendum. 
Statement of Facts 
Ryan W. Scarritt is one of two sons of the decedent. The decedent was 
unmarried at his death. Ryan W. Scarritt is therefore an heir of any property as to 
which the decedent was intestate. 
The decedent died owning a valuable ranch near Virgin, Utah, near Zion 
National Park. The decedent left a valid Will. While the Will mentions 
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classifications of real and personal property it contains no clause disposing of real 
property. The Will grants the personal representative authority to borrow against or 
sell the real property. 
The Will Of Curtiss S. Scarritt 
The Will of Curtiss S. Scarritt has eleven major Articles, numbered FIRST 
through TENTH. The Will is contained in the Addendum. There are eleven Articles 
because two are designated SECOND. Briefly, the purpose of each Article is: 
FIRST-revocation of prior wills 
SECOND-disposition of remains 
SECOND-direction for payment of debts 
THIRD-disposition of property 
FOURTH-appointment of personal representative 
FIFTH-directions regarding payment of estate taxes (subsection 1); 
application of dividends and allocation between principal and income 
(subsection 2); and treatment of bonds acquired for less that face 
value (subsection 3). 
SIXTH-disposition of "articles of personal, household or domestic use 
or adornment." 
SEVENTH-directions to personal representative regarding 
operations of "my real property located in Virgin, Utah," and 
authorization of the the personal representative to sell the real 
property and some personal property. 
EIGHTH-direction that the will should be probated according to Utah 
law. 
NINTH-explanation of no provision in the will for Donna Lynn Scarritt 
or Ryan Winthrop Scarritt. 
TENTH-<lirection that the personal representative consult with "The 
Park Firm." 
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Dispositive Provisions - The SIXTH Article 
There are only two provisions of the Will which deal in any way with the 
disposition of property. The most specific is the SIXTH Article which makes a 
disposition to Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.: 
SIXTH: I give and bequeath to my son, CURTISS S. SCARRITT, JR., 
absolutely, if he survives me, all articles of personal, household or 
domestic use or adornment, which may be included in my Utah estate 
at my death, excluding only such articles of farm and ranch machinery 
and equipment, together with horses and other livestock, and such 
personal property as may be selected and distributed pursuant to the 
provisions of Article THIRD hereof. 
This provision deals only with personal effects. It gives to Curtiss S. Scarritt, 
Jr., "all articles of personal, household or domestic use or adornment," which are 
clearly personal effects. The paragraph then goes on to exclude therefrom "articles 
of farm and ranch machinery and equipment" and "horses and other livestock" and 
other items which are usually not thought of as personal effects. The exclusion 
does nothing to broaden the meaning of the bequest. This SIXTH Article also 
notes that the personal effects CURTISS S. SCARRITT, JR., receives under that 
Article will be diminished by disposition of personal effects under the THIRD Article. 
The disposition of personal effects under the THIRD Article will be reviewed later. 
The SIXTH Article is clearly a disposition of personal effects, limited by the 
earlier disposition of personal effects in the THIRD Article. The lower court's 
decision, findings and conclusions concurred with this reading of the SIXTH 
Article.1 
Memorandum Decision, p.4, R. 115; Findings fl7, R.130; Conclusions f14, R. 135. 
Page 5 
Dispositive Provisions - The THIRD Article 
The THIRD Article is the major dispositive clause of the Will, containing five 
separate included subparagraphs numbered A through E. The opening sentence 
of the THIRD Article references the entire estate of the decedent,2 even though the 
enumerated subparagraphs do not deal with that entire estate: 
THIRD: All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both real 
and personal, of whatsoever kind and nature and wheresoever the 
same may be situated of which I shall die seized or possessed to 
which in any way I may be entitled at the time of my death, with the 
exception of the Horace S. Scarritt Trust which shall be administered 
by a Trust Officer of Banker's Trust, New York, New York, I give, 
devise, and bequeath as follows: 
The ensuing subparagraphs are summarized as follows: 
A. Disposition of approximately $150,000 of certificates of deposit. 
B. Disposition of sums in the Ferguson Capital account. 
C. Disposition of race horse related livestock and vehicles. 
D. Disposition of other livestock and saddle horses. 
E. Disposition of "personal property." 
The introductory clause of the THIRD Article clearly refers to "real and 
personal" properties of the decedent's estate, but no subparagraph therein uses 
the term "real property." In fact, the enumerated subparagraphs A through D deal 
narrowly with specific items of personal property. They effectively dispose of the 
enumerated items - CD's, the Ferguson Capital Account, livestock and equipment. 
The lower court's Memorandum Decision, Findings and Conclusions concur 
with this reading of subparagraphs A through D of the THIRD Article of the Will.3 
2
 The opening portion of the THIRD paragraph excludes the Horace S. Scarritt Trust,from the 
operation of the Will referring to it as being administered by a "Trust Officer of Banker's Trust, New 
York, New York" when in fact that Trust conferred no power of appointment upon the decedent but 
provided that on the decedent's demise that the Trust would be distributed to the two heirs of the 
decedent, Curtiss S. Scarritt Jr. and Ryan W. Scarritt. 
3
 Memorandum Decision P.4, R. 115; Findings 1f12, R. 131; Conclusions 1J9, R. 134. 
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Subparagraph E. - Personal Effects 
Subparagraph E of the THIRD Article also refers to "personal property." It 
reads: 
E. The personal property should be divided as follows: 
1. To Rod Orton - Black Ebony Sherry Set and a 4-10 
shotgun. 
2. The distribution of the remaining items of personal 
property should be determined by Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., 
Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park. 
The Petitioner claims this paragraph is not dispositive of all the residue of 
the estate. The lower court found it was.4 
Other Provisions 
After the dispositive THIRD and SIXTH Articles, the SEVENTH Article of the 
Will is an authorization for the personal representative to "sell all real property" 
together with all tangible personal property included in the estate but "not 
effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof." The 
Personal Representative is then directed "to add the proceeds of any such sale to 
my estate." 
I authorize my Personal Representative to sell all real property, 
together with all tangible personal property and livestock included in 
my estate and not effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD 
and SIXTH hereof, at such time or times and upon such terms and 
conditions as shall seem advisable and to add the proceeds of any 
such sale to my estate. 
The fact that Ryan W. Scarritt was not provided for in the Will was noted in 
the NINTH Article: 
. . . I make no provision for my son, Ryan Winthrop Scarritt for the 
reason that he will be well-provided for, following my death, under the 
will of my father, Horace S. Scarritt. 
4
 Memorandum Decision pp.4, 6 R. 115; Findings Kf14-15, 20 R. 131-133; Conclusions W O -
11,17, R. 135,136. 
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Finally, the Will requests the Personal Representative to "consult with" the 
decedent's attorneys "in the selection and distribution of my real and personal 
property." 
TENTH: I request my Utah Personal Representative to consult with and be 
guided by the advice of my friends of THE PARK FIRM, in the selection and 
distribution of my real and personal property. 
Sale of real property is not mentioned in that Article. 
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SUMMARY OF RYAN W. SCARRITTS ARGUMENT 
Ryan W. Scarritt claims that the decedent died intestate as to his realty and 
as to the personal property residue of his estate. There is admittedly no provision 
in the Will expressly disposing of real property. However, the Personal 
Representative claims that the authorization to sell the real estate "at such time or 
times and upon such terms and conditions as shall seem advisable" is sufficient to 
cause an equitable conversion of the realty to personalty. Ryan W. Scarritt claims 
that this precatory and indefinite authority to sell is insufficient to effect such a 
conversion, so the realty remains in the estate, unaffected by the Will. 
Further, even if there were a conversion of the realty by a mandated sale, 
Ryan W. Scarritt claims the Will fails to dispose of the proceeds of sale because the 
Will does not dispose of the residue of personal property. 
The clause which the Personal Representative claims disposes of the 
residue of the estate (personalty and converted realty) is a part of the THIRD Article 
which reads: 
E. The personal property should be divided as follows: 
1. To Rod Orton - Black Ebony Sherry Set and a 4-10 
shotgun. 
2. The distribution of the remaining items of personal 
property should be determined by Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., 
Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park. 
Ryan W. Scarritt claims that this clause does not dispose of the real estate. 
Ryan W. Scarritt also claims that it is not a residuary disposition of personal 
property because its context makes it pertinent only to personal effects. Ryan W. 
Scarritt therefore claims that the decedent died intestate as to his personal property 
residue as well as to the realty. 
Ryan W. Scarritt claims the Will itself recognizes that some of the estate will 
not be "effectively disposed of" by the dispositive provisions. The Will itself 
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POINT I THE COURT MUST RELY ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
WILL TO DETERMINE THE TESTATOR'S INTENT 
While the intention of a testator controls all interpretation of a will, that 
intention must be expressed within a will to be given effect. 
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of 
his disposition. Utah Code Ann. §75-2-603. 
A court, in construing a will, is limited to the language of the will. "A court's 
inquiry in construing a will is limited to ascertaining what the testator meant by the 
language which was used. If he used language which results in intestacy . . . the 
court must hold that the intestacy was intended." Estate of Beldon, 11 Cal. 2d 108, 
77 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1938)(emphasis added). 
Even if intestacy results from the language of a will, that result must follow. 
The court cannot change a will to avoid intestacy. The general presumption 
against intestacy will not act in contravention of a lack of dispositive language: 
[l]n order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the court is not 
permitted to put on the will any construction not expressed in it, and which is 
based on supposition as to the intention of the testator in the disposition of 
his estate. Estate ofCorwin, 86 Idaho 1, 383 P.2d 339, 341 (1963). 
An expression in a will can only be implemented so far as its language and 
the law allow. For example, this Will states it makes no provision for Ryan W. 
Scarritt. 
. . . I make no provision for my son, Ryan Winthrop Scarritt for the 
reason that he will be well-provided for, following my death, under the 
will of my father, Horace S. Scarritt. (Paragraph NINTH) 
This is not an affirmative disinheritance clause, but a remark that the Will gives 
Ryan W. Scarritt no bequest or devise. It does not express any intention that he 
shall not take assets from the decedent's estate; merely that he shall not take from 
the Will. Therefore, it is ineffective, by its own terms, to prohibit Ryan Scarritt from 
Page 11 
receiving an intestate inheritance. Its intention cannot be read beyond its 
language. 
Legal Limitations on the Testator 
But even if this were a standard disinheritance clause, purporting to prohibit 
testate and intestate inheritance from the decedent, it would have no effect 
whatsoever on assets passing by intestacy. Such an attempt is beyond the 
testator's legal power. When the testator attempts to exclude his heirs at law from 
inheriting his property, the exclusion goes only to such property as he has 
disposed of by his Will. Estate of Dunn, 120 Cal. 2d 294, 260 P.2d 964, 965 
(Cal.App. 1953); Estate of Lefranc, 38 Cal. 2d 289, 239 P.2d 617 (1952). 
It is settled that a disinheritance clause, no matter how broadly or 
strongly phrased, operates only to prevent a claimant from taking 
under the Will i t se l f . . . . Such a clause does not and cannot operate 
to prevent the heirs at law from taking under the statutory rules of 
inheritance when the decedent has died intestate as to all or any of 
his property. Estate of Barnes, 47 Cal. Rptr. 480, 407 P.2d 656, 659 
(1965). 
The maker of a will has no power over his property not disposed of by the 
will. "A testator cannot limit or eliminate an heir from receiving that portion of an 
estate governed by the statute of descent and distribution except by disposing of 
the property by Will." Estate of Brown, 106 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Mich. 1960); see also 
Powers v. Powers, 67 A.2d 837 (R.I. 1949). 
The lower court rejected these constraints of interpretation, even though it 
stated it did "not defend the draftsmanship of the will." The court admitted: 
There are certain technical problems with the way the Will was constructed. 
The order in which the provisions are stated causes some concern as does 
the construction of the paragraph in section THIRD. Memorandum Decision 
p.3.R. 114. 
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But the lower court rejected the arguments of Ryan W. Scarritt as "hypercritical." It 
ignored "troublesome" problems by finding paragraphs "misplaced."5 And it 
rejected the Will's clear statement that all the testator's property would be "not 
effectively disposed of by Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof." 
The Court does not view this as any statement that the Testator knew that 
certain items would be missed by the THIRD and SIXTH Articles of the will. 
Memorandum Decision p.6, R. 117. 
This Court should not indulge in redrafting of the Will as the lower court did, 
but must give effect to the language of the Will, as the law interprets it. 
The testator is presumed to know the law. If the legal effect of his 
expressed intent is intestacy, it will be presumed that he designed that 
intent. The inquiry will not go to the secret workings of the mind of the 
testator. It is not, what did he mean? but it is, what do his words 
mean? Estate of Mcllhattan, 224 N. W. 713 (Wis. 1929)(emphasis 
added). 
Memorandum Decision p.4, R. 115. 
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POINT II THE WILL DOES NOT DISPOSE OF REAL PROPERTY 
Real property is not expressly devised in the Will. The Will refers five times 
to "real" property, but none of those references purport to devise it.6 The two 
dispositive provisions in the Will do not even mention real property, much less 
identify to whom it should be distributed. 
The introduction of the THIRD Article makes the distinction between 
real and personal property. 
THIRD: All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both real 
and personal. . . 
But nowhere in subparagraphs A through E of the THIRD Article (or 
anywhere else in the Will) is there any reference to disposition of real 
property. Therefore, the Will does not dispose of the real property and the 
decedent is intestate as to any real estate owned at the time of his death. 
Other Provisions of the Will Are Consistent with Intestacy As To Real 
Estate 
The Will contains a provision dealing with real estate which is consistent 
with its failure to dispose of any real property. The SEVENTH Article of the Will is 
an authorization for the personal representative to "sell all real property" included 
in the estate "not effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH 
hereof" and a direction "to add the proceeds of any such sale to my estate." The 
Article specifically recognizes that the THIRD Article is not a residue clause and 
that there would be real property which would remain in the estate after the 
disposition made in the THIRD and SIXTH Articles. 
Articles THIRD, SEVENTH and TENTH include these references. 
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Property cannot be disposed of unless the Will (1) identifies the property to 
be devised, and (2) specifies who is to receive the property. The Will does neither. 
It states it does not dispose of realty. 
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POINT III THE WILL DOES NOT CONVERT THE REALTY TO 
PERSONALTY 
The lower court declared that the Will required the realty to be sold and that 
the proceeds would be distributed as part of the personal property under the Will. 
Article SEVENTH of the Will directs the personal representative to sell the 
decedent's real property . . . (Conclusions 1J16, R.136) 
The testator also intended . . . that the remaining proceeds of the sale of real 
property [after payment of taxes] be disposed of [with] all residual personal 
property. (Findings 1J20, R. 133) 
Without expressly stating it was doing so, the lower court invoked the 
doctrine of equitable conversion to treat the realty as personalty. It was declaring 
that the real estate, after mandatory sale, became personal property, and passed 
under the Will as personalty. 
Equitable conversion is a fiction. 18 C.J.S. Conversion §2. Usually, it is 
applied to convert a vendor's interest under a real estate contract into personal 
property. Utah cases have held that a contract seller of land owns only personalty, 
even though the seller still appears of record as owning the real estate. By the 
same doctrine, the purchaser under the contract owns "realty" even though he has 
no deed. The doctrine applies only when the obligation to sell is absolute.7 
7
 This doctrine results in exemption of the seller's interest in the land from rules applying to real 
property. For example, in Lach v. Zion's First National Bank, 746 P. 2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) a 
judgment lien was unable to attach to land already sold by the judgment debtor under an earnest 
money agreement. The Court of Appeals held that when the judgment came of record, the contract 
of sale had already converted the vendors' interest into personal property. 
See also Mired v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 399, 393 P.2d 791 (1964), which held that since "it 
is not contended that the vendors did not have an enforceable contract upon which they could have 
sued for specific performance," the doctrine applied to convert the record interest in real estate to 
personal property. 
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A Will Effects Equitable Conversion Only If Sale of the Realty is 
Mandatory 
Other states hold that equitable conversion can occur by will, as well as by 
contract, if the will imposes the same requirement of mandatory sale that a contract 
would impose.8 A discretionary power of sale is fatal to a claim of equitable 
conversion. 
The existence of a power on the part of an executor or trustee to sell realty 
does not work an equitable conversion thereof into personalty unless the 
executor or trustee is under a mandatory duty to sell the property in any 
event. If the power to sell is left to the option, discretion, or choice of trustees 
or others, no duty to make the change rests upon them, and hence no 
equitable conversion will result. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Equitable Conversion § 7 
(1966). 
It is clear that if a will does not contain a mandatory instruction to sell the real 
estate, the real estate cannot be converted and pass as personal property: 
A direction to sell or otherwise change the nature of property must, however, 
be both absolute and effective in order to work a conversion. A power of 
sale, which is not peremptory and absolute, but may be exercised entirely at 
the discretion of the executors or trustees, does not, of itself, work a 
conversion. Page, Page on Wills §46.3. 
Courts do not favor equitable conversion. Any doubt in interpreting this 
portion of the Will must be resolved against equitable conversion. 
The law does not favor equitable conversion of property . . . . Few testators 
have any knowledge of the doctrine . . . or any actual intent to change the 
nature of the property . . . . The presumption, therefore, no matter what the 
form of words used, is against conversion under a will, Where there is a 
doubt as to the intention of the testator, in a direction for the conversion of 
land into money, the original character of the property will not be changed. 
27 AM. JUR. 2D Equitable Conversion § 5 (1966) [emphasis added]. 
In the present case, the doctrine of equitable conversion cannot apply 
because the Will contains no mandate to sell the land. The pertinent paragraph in 
the SEVENTH Article reads as follows: 
8
 No Utah case invokes equitable conversion by will. Cases are generally from the Eastern U.S. 
and are older. 
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I authorize my Personal Representative to sell all real property, together with 
all tangible personal property and livestock included in my estate and not 
effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof, at such 
time or times and upon such terms and conditions as shall seem advisable 
and to add the proceeds of any such sale to my estate, (emphasis added) 
This paragraph is merely an authorization to sell real estate. It is not mandatory as 
the Personal Representative contends. In fact, it says that jf a sale occurs, it will 
occur "at such time or times and upon such terms and conditions as shall seem 
advisable." There is no specific schedule or commitment. The phrase "any such 
sale" indicates sale is not necessary. 
The lower court effectively changed the phrase "I authorize my Personal 
Representative to sell" to read "My Personal Representative shall sell." The court 
also changed the reference to "anv such sale" to refer to "the sale." The Will must 
not be rewritten to devise realty the testator did not devise. The Will must not be 
rewritten to convert realty into personalty to avoid intestacy as to realty. 
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POINT IV THE WILL WOULD NOT DEVISE ANY CONVERTED 
PROCEEDS OF REALTY 
The lower court found Article SEVENTH mandated a sale, changing the 
realty to personalty. Article SEVENTH indicates what should be done with the 
proceeds of any such sale. Article SEVENTH says the Personal Representative is 
to "add the proceeds of any such sale to my estate." This phrase does not attempt 
to devise the proceeds or even mention distribution. According to Article 
SEVENTH, if any sale occurs, the proceeds will remain with the "estate." The term 
"estate" includes all the decedent's property, whether passing by will, by trust, or by 
intestacy.9 To add the proceeds to the estate does not mean they are added to or 
disposed of with the "residue of the estate." 
The SEVENTH Article appears after the dispositive provisions of the Will. It 
does not refer back to those dispositive provisions, but says proceeds of any sale 
are to be added to the "estate." Since the Will does not say the realty or the 
proceeds are to be distributed under the Will, the realty must pass in intestacy. 
See U.C.A. §§ 75-1-201 (11) and 75-2-501. 
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POINT V THE WILL DOES NOT DISPOSE OF ALL OF THE 
DECEDENTS PERSONAL PROPERTY 
There are only two provisions of the Will which deal in any way with the 
disposition of personal property. The most narrow is the SIXTH Article which 
makes a disposition to Curtiss S. Scarritt Jr.: 
SIXTH: I give and bequeath to my son, CURTISS S. SCARRITT, JR., 
absolutely, if he survives me, all articles of personal, household or 
domestic use or adornment, which may be included in my Utah estate 
at my death, excluding only such articles of farm and ranch machinery 
and equipment, together with horses and other livestock, and such 
personal property as may be selected and distributed pursuant to the 
provisions of Article THIRD hereof. 
This provision deals only with personal effects. The lower court found this 
was a subsidiary bequest to the THIRD Article.10 
The THIRD Article is the major dispositive clause of the Will. It contains five 
separate subparagraphs numbered A through E. Each disposes of specific 
personal property: 
A. Disposition of approximately $150,000 of certificates of deposit. 
B. Disposition of sums in the Ferguson Capital account. 
C. Disposition of race horse related livestock and vehicles. 
D. Disposition of other livestock and saddle horses. 
E. Disposition of personal property." 
Subparagraph E of the THIRD Article is the clause central to this dispute. It 
reads: 
E. The personal property should be divided as follows: 
1. To Rod Orton - Black Ebony Sherry Set and a 4-10 
shotgun. 
2. The distribution of the remaining items of personal 
property should be determined by Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., 
Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park. 
Memorandum Decision p.4, R. 115; Rndings Uf17,18, R. 132; Conclusions 1J14, R. 135. 
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The court found that subparagraph E.2. was a disposition of the residue of 
the estate. 
Subsection E.2. of paragraph THIRD constitutes a residuary clause to 
dispose of any and all personal property in the estate which had not been 
disposed of by specific bequest in the Will. Conclusions 1110 R. 135. 
The court's conclusion that this is a residue clause means that a committee can 
dispose of the residue of the estate. 
The testator intended that the committee of three have power to dispose of 
all items of personal property remaining in the estate after the specific 
bequests set out in the Will were satisfied. Findings 1f15 R. 132. 
Ryan W. Scarritt claims this is not a residue clause. Whether the Will 
contains a personal property residue clause is important for at least two reasons: 
a. A personal property residue clause could dispose of converted real 
estate, if the Will made a conversion of realty to personalty. 
b. If there is no personal property residue clause, the decedent was 
intestate not only as to real estate but also as to all personal property 
except the specifically devised certificates of deposit, Ferguson 
Capital Account, race horse related livestock and vehicles, other 
livestock, and personal effects. 
Ryan W. Scarritt claims this subparagraph does not dispose of the personal 
property residue for three reasons: 
A. Article SEVENTH recognizes Articles THIRD and SIXTH does not 
dispose of the entire estate. 
B. The position and language of subparagraph E make it clear it does 
not affect all remaining personal property. 
C. The manner of disposition under subparagraph E.2. is inconsistent 
with disposition of the bulk of the estate. 
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A. The SEVENTH Article Recognizes the Limited Scope of the 
THIRD Article 
The claimed residuary clause is part of the THIRD Article. If it were really a 
residuary clause, it would dispose of all the property in the estate not listed in 
subparagraphs A through E. 
But the SEVENTH Article recognizes the Personal Representative may want 
to sell property not disposed by the THIRD Article: 
I authorize my Personal Representative to sell all real property, together with 
all tangible personal property and livestock included in mv estate and not 
effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof, . . . and 
to add the proceeds of any such sale to my estate, [emphasis added] 
If subparagraph E of the THIRD Article were a residue clause, it would 
dispose of everything. There would be nothing "not effectively disposed of" for the 
Personal Representative to sell. The lower court achieved its result by declaring 
the SEVENTH Article did not mean what it said: 
This phrase does not indicate that the testator knew certain items would be 
missed by the THIRD and SIXTH Paragraphs of the Will. Findings 1121, R. 
133. 
The lower court said the SEVENTH Article meant nothing, since nothing "slipped 
through" the THIRD and SIXTH Articles. 
Rather, the Court views this statement as a boilerplate catch-all phrase 
intended to apply to anything that the testator may have forgotten about or 
anything that may have slipped through the provisions of paragraphs THIRD 
and SIXTH due to a dispute as to the character of the property, whether real 
or personal, tangible or intangible. Findings f21 , R.133. 
The lower court therefore nullified a specific internal reference in the Will in order to 
find testacy. 
This Court should respect the SEVENTH Article in interpreting the THIRD 
Article. The SEVENTH Article says there will be property not disposed of by the 
THIRD Article. 
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B. The THIRD Article does not dispose of all personal property 
The "personal property" disposed of in subparagraph E of the THIRD Article 
is really just "personal effects." The term "personal property" can have a broad or 
narrow meaning depending on how it is used. The lower court held that the term 
"personal property" should be read broadly in reading subparagraph E. 2. of the 
Article THIRD. This goes against the language of the Will. Subparagraph E reads: 
E. The personal property should be divided as follows: 
1. To Rod Orton - Black Ebony Sherry Set and a 4-10 
shotgun. 
2. The distribution of the remaining items of personal 
property should be determined by Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., 
Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park. 
The introduction to this subparagraph E does not refer to the remaining 
items of personal property (such as cash, accounts, etc.) even though the 
preceding subparagraphs A through D made specific bequests of other items of 
personal property. Subparagraph E reads as an introduction of a new category in 
the preceding list of categories. 
In other cases where the Will disposed of the last items in a category it was 
clear. In subparagraph B, which disposed of the Ferguson Capital Account, two 
specific bequests were followed by a disposition of "the remaining funds." 
Subparagraph C, disposing of "race horse related livestock" is followed by 
subparagraph Dfs disposition of "all other livestock." These paragraphs show that 
the Will used internal referencing to show when the last items of a group were 
indicated. 
In contrast, after the preceding subparagraphs A through D which each 
dispose of personal property, subparagraph E does not open with a reference to 
"all other" or "the remaining" personal property. Therefore, subparagraph E must 
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refer to "personal property" as a new category in this list of bequests. The term 
"personal property" is being used for a narrow category. 
Subparagraph E is clearly not a residue clause for all personal property, or it 
would refer to "the remaining personal property," not "the personal property." It is a 
new category, first exemplified by the sherry set and gun. Because the 
introduction of subparagraph E shows that the subparagraph deals with a new 
category of personal property, and because the listed items in subparagraph E.1. 
are personal effects, the testator intended all of subparagraph E to deal with 
personal effects. 
Therefore, subparagraph E.2. has the limited effect of disposing of the 
remaining personal effects after the sherry set and shotgun have been given to Rod 
Orton. Its reference to the "remaining personal property" is in the limited sphere of 
"remaining personal effects." 
C. The Manner of Disposition in Subparagraph E.2. Indicates It 
Has a Limited Scope. 
The manner of disposition specified in subparagraph E.2. is consistent with 
its limited subject matter. Subparagraph E.2. does not name the recipients of the 
remaining personal effects, but merely gives the disposition of those effects into the 
discretion of Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park. It 
therefore resembles a common method of disposing of miscellaneous personal 
effects, divided up as close friends may agree. If subparagraph E.2. was intended 
to dispose of a residue of personal property, instead of a residue of personal 
effects, it would have named specific recipients, instead of delegating disposition to 
the unbridled discretion of a committee. 
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D. Evaluation of the Will with a Specific Example Reveals 
Subparagraph E.2. is Not a Residue Clause. 
Examination of the treatment of livestock in the Will provides a clear 
illustration of the flow of the Will. Subparagraph E.2. appears in its proper limited 
function in the examination. 
The Livestock Illustration 
AHLivgsjggk 
Livestock is first mentioned in the THIRD / ^ ^ \ 
* .. , . , L •N • it L. / R a c e Horse \ Don Randall 
Article, where subparagraph C gives race horse / Related Uvestock \ — * * 




 V Other Livestock / Pete Heaton 
D. gives "other livestock" to Pete Heaton. V y 
Between these two categories of livestock — 'race horse related* and 'other — all 
livestock are devised. But the SEVENTH Article says there may be livestock "not 
disposed of," which can be sold. The Will anticipates that a specific bequest to 
Randall or Heaton might fail. This could occur if either of them had predeceased 
the decedent. 
If subparagraph E.2. were truly a residue clause for all remaining personal 
property, it would dispose of any failed bequest to Randall or Heaton. The 
SEVENTH Article could never operate upon any 'livestock not effectively disposed 
of by Article THIRD' because the purported residue clause — subparagraph E.2. — 
would dispose of it before the SEVENTH Article came into play. 
The lower court has held that subparagraph E.2. is a residue clause for the 
proceeds of realty, and for all personalty, but this denies effect to the language of 
the SEVENTH Article. The SEVENTH Article is made superfluous, and the 
reference to property "not effectively disposed of" is made meaningless by the 
court's order that all residue property would be "caught" by the net of subparagraph 
E.2. 
Page 25 
To specifically illustrate, if Mr. Heaton 
had predeceased Mr. Scarritt, the bequest to 
Heaton would fail. According to the lower 
court's ruling, the "other livestock" would then 
pass through the THIRD Article (untouched by 
subparagraph E.2.) to be sold by the authority 
of the SEVENTH Article. Then, by the court's 
ruling, the proceeds of the sale of the 
"livestock not effectively disposed of" would 
return to be governed by subparagraph E.2. of 
the THIRD Article. This does not make sense. SEVENTH 
The lower court's holding that subparagraph E.2. is a residue clause for 
personal property in a broad sense fails because the SEVENTH Article specifically 
recognizes that there would be personal property not effectively disposed of by 
subparagraph E.2. of the THIRD Article. The Will is consistent only if subparagraph 
E.2. is interpreted as a personal effects residue clause. The decedent is intestate 
as to all personal property except that disposed of by the specific bequests. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court determined that the Will disposed of the decedent's entire 
estate, real and personal. Since it is admitted that the Will does not expressly dispose 
of realty, the Court was forced to find the Will converted the realty to personalty, and 
that the real property was disposed of as if it were personal property. 
The flaw in the lower court's ruling is that the Will does not mandate sale of the 
real estate, which is a requirement for equitable conversion to be implemented. The 
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lower court did not find that the Will mandated sale of the realty and it in fact is not 
mandated. Therefore, the decedent was intestate as to his real estate. 
Further, the decedent was intestate as to his personal property residue. While 
the Will disposes of certain specific items of personal property, there is no clause 
effectively disposing of the remaining personal property. The lower court found that a 
clause disposing of the decedent's remaining personal effects disposed of the 
personal property residue. But this interpretation contradicts another provision of the 
Will which recognizes that there will be personal property "not disposed of" by that very 
clause which the lower court found to be a residue disposition. 
Ryan W. Scarritt asks that the Court declare the decedent intestate as to his real 
property and the residue of his personal property. 
DATED THIS of January, 1992. 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
A Professional Corporation 
DAVID NUFFER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL ADIODBICT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate ) 
of ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CURTISS S. SCARRITT, ) 
Deceased. ) Probate No. 913500084 
This matter came before the Court on August 22nd, 1991, 
for argument on a Petition of Ryan W. Scarritt for Formal Probate of 
the Will, Construction of the Will, Declaration of Partial Intestacy, 
and Supervised Administration. Mr. Scarritt was represented by his 
counsel, David Nuffer. The personal representative, Rodney K. Orton 
was present with his counsel, Michael M. Later and Michael W. Park. 
Mr. Russell Gallian appeared and participated on behalf of Milly 
Heaton, one of the devisees in the Will. 
The Court received oral argument in the matter. It 
appears that the parries have agreed that the Will should be formally 
probated rather than informally probated. The Court now Orders the 
Will admitted to forral probate. It further appears that the parties 
have agreed that supervised administration is appropriate although 
there appears to be a dispute as to the assets to be included in the 
administration. The Court now Orders the administation of the estate 
to be supervised subject to later modification upon specific motion to 
limit that supervision. 
Following oral argument on the matter the Court took the 
matter under submission and having now reviewed the file and the Will 
and being fully advised in the premises the Court now enters the 
following Decision and Order. 
The resolution of the issues in the Petition by Ryan W. 
Scarritt depends upon the construction which this Court gives to the 
Last Will and Testament of Curriss S. Scarritt. The Last Will and 
Testament was received at the hearing as Court's Exhibit number 1. 
The Court is aware that in construing the Will of the decedent it must 
take into consideration that there is a strong presumption in favor of 
testacy and against intestacy. This presumption makes considerable 
sense since one can presume that if the testator took the effort to go 
to an attorney to try to arrange his affairs prior to his death and to 
have a document drafted which would dictate how his assets were to be 
handled following his death, ne would intend that the document dispose 
of all of his assets. The Court is also aware that it is the burden 
of the petitioners in this case to demonstrate that the only 
reasonable interpretation of the Will leads to a finding of 
intestacy. If there is a reasonable interpretation of the Will which 
leads to testacy rather than intestacy then the Court is obligated to 
adopt the reasonable interpretation leading to a finding of testacy. 
The Court is likewise aware that it is the intent of the testator 
which should govern in these proceedings so far as that intent is 
demonstrated by the contents of the Will. Resort to extrinsic 
* r; 
evidence is permitted only when the testator attempts to state his 
intention in the Will but does so ambiguously. Resort to extrinsic 
evidence is then premitted in an attempt to clarify his intention. 
Resort to extrinsic evidence is not permitted to supply terms or 
provisions which were omitted from the Will. 
With these principals in mind the Court finds that Curtiss 
S. Scarritt did in fact die testate as to all of his property. The 
Court finds that there is a reasonable interpretation of the Will 
which would include all of the property in the Scarritt estate within 
the dispositive provisions of the Will. In so finding the Court does 
not defend the draftsmanship of the Will. There are certain technical 
problems with the way the Will was constructed. The order in which 
the provisions are stated causes some concern as does the construction 
of the paragraph in section THIRD. However these technical problems 
with the Will should not be applied in such a hypercritical fashion as 
to defeat the obvious intent of the testator. 
Specifically this Court finds that the testator in 
Paragraph NINTH of the Will stated his express intent to make no 
provision for his son Ryan Winthrop Scarritt for the reason that Ryan 
was or would be well provided for under the Will of Horace S. 
Scarritt. That statement of the testator's intent is crystal clear. 
Were the Court to find that Mr. Scarritt intended to die intestate, it 
would be in direct contravention of the express provisions of 
paragraph NINTH. 
i±4 
In paragraph THIRD the testator attempted to dispose of 
all real or personal property which he might possess at the time of 
his death with the exception of the Horace S. Scarritt Trust. The 
construction of this paragraph causes some concern but it is clear 
that he intended to give individual bequests to certain parties who 
are listed in sub-paragraphs A, B, C, D and E. The Court finds that 
sub-paragraph (E)[2] creates a valid power of appointment in a 
committee of three persons, Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton, 
the personal representative and James M. Park, Attorney at Law and 
author of the Will. That committee of three has the power to dispose 
of all items of personal property remaining in the estate after the 
specific bequests set out in the Will have been satisfied. 
Somewhat troublesome is the fact that thereafter in 
paragraph SIXTH there is again a specific bequest of certain items of 
personal property. Petitioner has argued that this indicates that 
paragraph (E)[2] was not intended to dispose of all items of personal 
property. The Court finds that paragraph SIXTH is simply misplaced in 
the Will. It was obviously intended as an additional individual 
bequest subject to the provisions of paragraph THIRD. The fact that 
this specific and individual bequest was included in a separate 
paragraph should not be seen as an indicator that the testator did not 
mean what he said in paragraph THIRD (E)[2]. 
.is 
In summary, the Court finds that the testator intended to 
accomplish the following by the provisions of his Will. 
After providing for revocation of any other wills and 
codicils and directing that his body be cremated and that his debts 
and funeral expenses be paid, the testator attempted to dispose of all 
of his property by individual bequests and by placing anything 
remaining in the hands of the committee of three to dispose of as they 
saw fit. It is significant that he included in that committee two of 
his close friends and his son. The Court finds that paragraph (E)[2] 
of the Will was intended as a residuary clause to dispose of any and 
all personal property in the estate which had not been disposed of by 
specific bequest in the Will. In paragraph FOURTH the testator 
appoints his friend to act as personal representative without bond. 
In paragraph FIFTH the testator attempted to establish a plan for the 
payment of estate taxes. The Court finds that it was the intent of 
the testator that any estate taxes charged against assets passing 
under the Will should be paid as a debt of the estate rather than paid 
by the devisees. 
In paragraph SEVENTH the testator established the method 
for payment of the debts of the estate including estate taxes. That 
method was for the personal representative to borrow monies against 
his considerable real properties located in Virgin, Utah and to keep 
that operation running until such time as the personal representative 
could with all prudence sell the property. The Court finds that it 
was the intention of the testator that the property be sold but that 
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he has given the personal representative reasonable discretion and 
latitude in deciding how to accomplish the sale and to establish the 
timing of the sale to maximize the price. It is the finding of the 
Court that the testator's desire was that his ranch be sold, that the 
proceeds be used to pay estate taxes and that any remaining proceeds 
be disposed of by the provisions of paragraph THIRD, or placed in the 
hands of the committee of three for disposition. 
In paragraph SEVENTH there is a catch-all phrase which the 
testator included which authorizes the personal representative to sell 
all real property and all tangible personal property and livestock 
which are included in his estate and not previously disposed of 
pusuant to the THIRD and SIXTH articles of the Will. The Court does 
not view this as any statement that the testator knew that certain 
items would be missed by the THIRD and SIXTH articles of the Will. 
Rather the Court views this as a boilerplate catch-all phrase intended 
to apply to anything that the testator may have forgotten about or 
anything that may have slipped through the provisions of paragraphs 
THIRD and SIXTH due to a dispute as to the character of the property, 
whether personal or real, tangible or intangible. 
±f 
Accordingly the Court finds that the Will can be 
reasonably interpreted so as to avoid intestacy and declines to accept 
as the only reasonable interpretation the interpretation urged by the 
Petitioner that the decedent died partially intestate. The Petition 
for Declaration of Partial Intestacy is Denied. The assets of the 
decedent should all pass to successors in interest pursuant to the 
express provisions of the Will. 
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Fifth District" Judge 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
CURTISS S. SCARRITT, 
Deceased. 
ORDER OF FORMAL PROBATE OF 
WILL, CONSTRUCTION OF WILL, 
IMPOSITION OF SUPERVISED 
ADMINISTRATION, AND DENIAL 
OF PETITION FOR DECLARATION 
OF PARTIAL INTESTACY 
Probate No. 913500084 
The Honorable J. Philip Eves 
The Petition of Ryan W. Scarritt for Formal Probate of 
Will, Construction of Will, Declaration of Partial Intestacy, and 
Supervised Administration (the "Petition") came before the Court 
for hearing on August 22, 1991. David Nuffer appeared on behalf 
of petitioner Ryan W. Scarritt. Michael M. Later and Michael W. 
rs,C, 
Park appeared on behalf of the personal representative, Rodney K. 
Orton. Russell Gallian appeared on behalf of devisee Betsy Cheney, 
The Court, having heard oral argument, having carefully 
considered the briefs and submissions of the parties, and having 
entered its Memorandum Decision on September 5, 1991, finds as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The decedent died on June 5, 1991, domiciled in 
Washington County, State of Utah. 
2. This proceeding was commenced within the time period 
provided by law. 
3. Venue is proper. 
4. The required notice has been given or waived. 
5. The testamentary instrument to which the Petition 
relates, the Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S. Scarritt, dated 
May 29, 1991, is the decedent's last will. 
6. The Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S. Scarritt, 
dated May 29, 1991, was validly executed. 
7. The parties have agreed that the Will should be 
formally probated. 
8. The parties appear to have agreed that supervised 
administration of the estate is appropriate although there appears 
to be a dispute as to the assets that should be subject to 
supervised administration. 
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9. There is a reasonable interpretation of the Will 
that will include all of the decedents real and personal property 
within the dispositive provisions of the Will. 
10. The testator in paragraph NINTH of the Will stated 
his express intent to make no provision for his son Ryan W. 
Scarritt for the reason that Ryan was or would be well provided for 
under the Will of Horace S. Scarritt. That intent is crystal 
clear, and were the Court to find that Mr. Scarritt intended to die 
intestate, it would be in direct contravention of the express 
provisions of paragraph NINTH of the Will. 
11. In paragraph THIRD of the Will, the testator 
expressed his intent to dispose of all real or personal property 
which he might possess at the time of his death, with the exception 
of the Horace S. Scarritt Trust. 
12. Paragraph THIRD of the Will clearly provides that 
the testator intended to give individual bequests to certain 
parties who are listed in subsections A, B, C, D, and E.l. 
13. As expressed in paragraph THIRD, and as demonstrated 
by the entirety of the Will, the testator intended subsection E.2. 
as a residuary clause to dispose of any and all personal property 
in the estate which had not been disposed of by specific bequest 
in the Will. 
14. In subsection E.2., the testator intended to create 
a power of appointment in a committee of three persons, Curtiss S. 
Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton, the personal representative, and 
James M. Park, Attorney at Law and author of the Will. It is 
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significant that the testator included in this committee two of his 
close personal friends and his son Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. 
15. The testator intended that the committee of three 
have power to dispose of all items of personal property remaining 
in the estate after the specific bequests set out in the Will were 
satisfied. 
16. As expressed in paragraph FIFTH of the Will, the 
testator intended that any estate taxes charged against assets 
passing under the Will should be paid as a debt of the estate 
rather than be paid by the devisees. 
17. Although paragraph SIXTH of the Will again provides 
for a specific bequest of certain items of personal property, the 
court finds that paragraph SIXTH is simply misplaced in the Will. 
The testator obviously intended paragraph SIXTH as an additional 
individual bequest, subject to the specific individual bequests 
made in paragraph THIRD. 
18. The fact that the additional individual bequest made 
in paragraph SIXTH of the Will is contained in a separate paragraph 
from paragraph THIRD does not indicate that the testator intended 
subsection E.2. of paragraph THIRD to be anything other than a 
residuary personal property clause. 
19. It was the intention of the testator, as expressed 
in paragraph SEVENTH of the Will, that his real property in Virgin, 
Utah be sold and that his personal representative have reasonable 
discretion and latitude in deciding how and when to accomplish the 
sale in order to maximize the price. 
-4-
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20. The testator also intended that the personal 
representative borrow monies against his real property in Virgin, 
Utah for the purpose of paying the estate taxes and that the 
remaining proceeds of the sale of the real property be disposed of 
according to the Will, namely, by the committee of three empowered 
in paragraph THIRD, subsection E.2., to dispose of all residual 
personal property. 
21. In paragraph SEVENTH of the Will there is a catch-
all phrase authorizing the personal representative to sell all real 
property and all tangible personal property and livestock which are 
included in his estate and not previously disposed of pursuant to 
paragraphs THIRD and SIXTH of the Will. This phrase does not 
indicate that the testator knew certain items would be missed by 
the THIRD and SIXTH paragraphs of the Will. Rather, the Court 
views this statement as a boilerplate catch-all phrase intended to 
apply to anything that the testator may have forgotten about or 
anything that may have slipped through the provisions of paragraphs 
THIRD and SIXTH due to a dispute as to the character of the 
property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The resolution of the issues contained in the 
Petition of Ryan W. Scarritt depends upon the construction this 
Court gives to the Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S. Scarritt. 
2. There is a strong presumption in favor of testacy 
and against intestacy. The petitioner bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the only reasonable interpretation of the Will 
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leads to a finding of intestacy. If there is a reasonable 
interpretation of the Will which leads to testacy rather than 
intestacy, the Court is obligated to adopt the reasonable 
interpretation leading to a finding of testacy. 
3. The intent of the testator governs these proceedings 
so far as that intent is demonstrated by the contents of the Will. 
4. Resort to extrinsic evidence is permitted only when 
the testator attempts to state his intention in the Will but does 
so ambiguously. Resort to extrinsic evidence is then permitted in 
an attempt to clarify his intention. 
5. Resort to extrinsic evidence is not permitted to 
supply terms or provisions which were omitted from the Will. 
6. Resort to extrinsic evidence is unnecessary in these 
proceedings, because the testator's intent is clearly expressed in 
the Will. 
7. While there are certain technical problems with the 
way the Will was constructed, such as the order of its provisions 
and the construction of paragraph THIRD, these technical problems 
should not be applied in such a hypercritical fashion as to defeat 
the obvious intent of the testator. 
8. There is a reasonable interpretation of the Will 
that will include all of the property in the Curtiss S. Scarritt 
estate within the dispositive provisions of the Will. 
9. The testator made specific individual bequests of 
personal property to the parties listed in paragraph THIRD, 
subsections A, B, C, D, and E.l. 
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10. Subsection E.2. of paragraph THIRD constitutes a 
residuary clause to dispose of any and all personal property in 
the estate which had not been disposed of by specific bequest in 
the Will. 
11. Subsection E.2. of paragraph THIRD creates a valid 
power of appointment in a committee of three persons, Curtiss S. 
Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton, the personal representative, and 
James M. Park, Attorney at Law and author of the Will, to dispose 
of all items of personal property remaining in the estate after the 
specific bequests set out in the Will have been satisfied. 
12. Paragraph FOURTH of the Will appoints Rodney K. 
Orton to act as personal representative without bond. 
13. Paragraph FIFTH of the Will directs that any estate 
taxes charged against the assets passing under the Will be paid as 
a debt of the estate, without apportionment, rather than be paid 
by the devisees. 
14. Paragraph SIXTH of the Will establishes an 
additional individual bequest of certain items of personal 
property, subject to the specific individual bequests made in 
paragraph THIRD. This bequest is simply misplaced in the Will and 
does not indicate that subsection E.2. of paragraph THIRD was not 
intended as a residuary clause. 
15. Paragraph SEVENTH of the Will establishes the method 
for payment of the debts of the estate, including estate taxes. 
Paragraph SEVENTH directs the personal representative to borrow 
monies against the decedent's considerable real property located 
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in Virgin, Utah and to keep that operation running until such time 
as the personal representative can with all prudence sell the 
property. 
16. Paragraph SEVENTH of the Will directs the personal 
representative to sell the decedent's real property, but gives the 
personal representative reasonable discretion and latitude in 
deciding how and when to accomplish the sale in order to maximize 
the price. 
17. Paragraph SEVENTH of the Will directs the personal 
representative to add the proceeds of the sale of decedent's real 
property to the estate for use in paying the debts of the estate 
including estate taxes. The remaining proceeds are to be placed 
into the hands of the committee of three for disposition, in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph THIRD. 
18. Paragraph NINTH directs that none of the decedent's 
estate pass to his son, Ryan W. Scarritt, for the reason that Ryan 
has been or will be well provided for under the Will of Horace S. 
Scarritt. Ryan W. Scarritt therefore takes nothing under the 
decedent's Will. 
19. The decedent disposed of all of his real and 
personal property under the Will and therefore did not die 
intestate as to any portion of his estate. Any residue of his 
estate not specifically devised passes under the residuary clause 
of paragraph THIRD, subsection E.2. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S. Scarritt, dated May 29, 1991, 
is hereby formally probated. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
administration of the estate shall be supervised, subject to later 
modification upon specific motion to limit the assets subject to 
supervision. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all of 
the decedent's assets shall pass to his successors-in-interest 
under the express provisions of the Will. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
estate taxes for all assets passing under the Will shall be paid 
as a debt, without apportionment, and not be charged against the 
interests of the devisees under the Will. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
petition of Ryan W. Scarritt for a declaration of partial intestacy 
is hereby denied. 
The Court certifies under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure that this Order constitutes a final, appealable 
order as to the petitions of Ryan W. Scarritt for formal probate 
of the Will, construction of the Will, and declaration of partial 
intestacy. These estate proceedings involve multiple interested 
parties and multiple claims on the estate. This Order finally 
adjudicates the petitions of Ryan W. Scarritt for formal probate 
of the Will, construction of the Will, and declaration of partial 
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intestacy and disposes of any claim that Ryan W. Scarritt may have 
in the decedent's estate. 
The Court further finds that there is no just reason for 
delaying an appeal of these matters. Delaying appeal would only 
work injustice to all parties involved, since the personal 
representative cannot prudently distribute certain assets from the 
estate while any question remains regarding the petitioner's 
claims. The Court directs entry of judgment in favor of Ryan W. 
Scarritt on his petition for formal probate of the Will. The Court 
directs entry of judgment against Ryan W. Scarritt and in favor of 
the personal representative on the petitioner's request for 
construction of the Will and declaration of partial intestacy. 
All other interested parties with notice of these proceedings are 
likewise bound by this final order and judgment. 
To the extent that this Order grants the petition for 
supervised administration, the Order is non-final and subject to 
revision on specific motion, as indicated above. 
DATED this £5 - day o f ^ W ^ i ^ ^ , 1991. 
&<s44 J./^hilip Eve^" 
Presiding District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^Oy-zXday of September, 1991, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing' proposed order was served 
on each of the following, by depositing a copy in the United States 
Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
David Nuffer, Esq. 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
Attorneys for Ryan W. Scarritt 
90 East 200 North 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, UT 84771-0400 
Russell J. Gallian, Esq. 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
Attorneys for Betsy Cheney 
One South Main 
Box 3 67 
St. George, UT 84771 
Thomas Taylor, Esq. 
Attorney for Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. 
P.O. Box 429 
Santa Rosa, CA 95402 
Pete Heaton 
Virgin, UT 84779 
Milly Heaton 
Virgin, UT 84779 
Angel Nolasco 
Virgin, UT 84779 
Don Randall 
13 0 North 100 East 
Washington, UT 84780 
Sigma Nu Fraternity 
Beta Omicron Chapter 
University of the South 
Sewanee, TN 37375-4004 
>,»£ C-i- rkL*- fa ( ,/ s f «w» 
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Order Certifying Memorandum 
Decision under Rule 54(b) 
Addendum Item Number 3 
:;T COURT 
:: COUNTY 
DAVID NUFFER- Utah 2431 Arizona 012540
 Q1 C C D O . D m u U r 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE a i Qtr d! r!I 1 16 
A Professional Corporation ,,, ,. 
90 East 200 North KV~\)--~'TA/S^JA^ 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84771-0400 
801/628-1611 
pi 091091 265002 DN MC 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
CURTISS S. SCARRITT, 
Deceased. 
ORDER CERTIFYING MEMORANDUM 
DECISION UNDER RULE 54 (b) 
Probate No. 913500084 
Petitioner Ryan W. Scarritt has moved that the Court's "Memorandum of 
Decision" entered September 5,1991, be certified under Rule 54 (b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. That rule provides: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one 
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. 
In this probate action, there are many claims and issues to be determined, such 
as the claims of creditors, confirmations of sales and approval of distributions of 
property. The Court's Memorandum of Decision disposes of the claimed rights of 
Petitioner Ryan W. Scarritt as an intestate heir. Therefore, it represents a final 
determination by this Court of those issues. The issues were fully briefed and 
extensively argued. The Court's determination of those issues will not change as the 
administration of the estate proceeds. 
Therefore, the Court 
a. expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and 
b. expressly directs the entry of its judgment, already stated in the 
Memorandum Decision, that the decedent died testate as to all his property and 
that Ryan W. Scarritt stands to inherit nothing from the estate of Curtiss S. 
Scarritt. 
The date of this order shall be the date upon which the Memorandum Decision 
is final for purposes of Rule 54(b). 
DATED THIS<g£_-day of , 1991 
BY THE COURT 
J. I^ HILIP EVES 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of September, 1991, I served an 
unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER CERTIFYING MEMORANDUM DECISION 
UNDER RULE 54 (b) on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, 
postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Michael W. Park, Esq. 
P. O. Box 2438 
St. George, UT 84770 
Michael M. Later, Esq. 
Gregory M. Hess, Esq. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys for Rodney K. Orton 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Thomas Taylor, Esq. 
Attorney for Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. 
P.O. Box 429 
Santa Rosa, CA 95402 
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. 
2340 Sycamore Ave. 
Santa Rosa, CA 95404 
Pete Heaton 
Virgin, UT 84779 
Milly Heaton 
Virgin, UT 84770 
Angel Nolasco 
Virgin, UT 84779 
Don Randall 
130 North 100 East 
Washington, UT 84780 
Russell J. Gallian, Esq. 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
Attorneys for Betsy Cheney 
One South Main 
Box 367 
St. George, UT 84771 
Sigma Nu Fraternity 
Beta Omicron Chapter 
University of the South 
Sewanee, TN 37375-4004 
pldfMffK. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of September, 1991, I served a 
signed copy of the foregoing ORDER CERTIFYING MEMORANDUM DECISION 
UNDER RULE 54 (b) on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, 
postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Michael W. Park, Esq. 
P. O. Box 2438 
St. George, UT 84770 
Michael M. Later, Esq. 
Gregory M. Hess, Esq. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys for Rodney K. Orton 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Thomas Taylor, Esq. 
Attorney for Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. 
P.O. Box 429 
Santa Rosa, CA 95402 
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. 
2340 Sycamore Ave. 
Santa Rosa, CA 95404 
Pete Heaton 
Virgin, UT 84779 
Milly Heaton 
Virgin, UT 84779 
Angel Nolasco 
Virgin, UT 84779 
Don Randall 
130 North 100 East 
Washington, UT 84780 
Russell J. Gallian, Esq. 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
Attorneys for Betsy Cheney 
One South Main 
Box 367 
St. George, UT 84771 
Sigma Nu Fraternity 
Beta Omicron Chapter 
University of the South 
Sewanee, TN 37375-4004 
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Will of Curtiss S. Scarritt 
Addendum Item Number 4 
Wa#i3B$tfl ^ ^ s ? f ctttrim* 
CURTISS , CAi'. ITT 
;i
 p I "in ,h 1 | vi" "' M! i ry In, County of 
Washington . jte of Utah and being ovc: the age ot eighteen years 
and being of sound »r^ nosing mind 2nd memory and not acting 
,1 portion whomsoevi 1 
D hereby make, 11. \ . - •. (* ,:s to be ray Last Will and 
Testamer^ * •* * *"*" f^i-'W' 
it. ^  i- , nny nnrl 111 1 tnrnmr Wills 
and Codicils norotofoie . . y > ..e. 
SKrnvn: - body 1 cremated and the onhes 
•x • o do* . 'Lined by wnere my deatn taKes place. 
7 
JIG.** .- easonab;v convenient; and 1 nereby authorize -nd 
empower v Executor t ~nv- r* ^ ^ maae agains* ~- estate, 
r!:- *-. rhc* ;o£>' , remamcer . . .f, estate, 
both j.cai emu personal, of "h^Tc^ver 3 
horesoever the same* ma^ be si~~-_w~ .1 ;,.__. - ~*:o. ^3-«ad 
,„r possessed * . <;.*!..... ^ n any wav . ,T.av oe entitled ct the time of 
ray deatl .:i., - < " trtion ui the Horace S. Scarritt Trust which 
shall be administered by a Trust Officer of Banker's Trust, New 
York, New York, I give, devise, and bequeath as follows: 
A. Certificates of Deposit totaling approximately 
$150,000.00 which are presently in the possession of Lois 
Iverson shall be distributed as follows: 
1. 20% to Pete Heaton; 
2. 20% to Milly Heaton; 
3. 20% to Angel Nolasco 
4. 40% to Don Randall 
B . The sums from the Ferguson Capital Account shall be 
disbursed as follows: 
1. The sum of $2,000.00 per month to Betsy Cheney 
of Lake City Colorado, until the funds 
remaining in said account are distributed as 
set forth in paragraph 3. 
2. The sum of $10,000.00 shall be delivered to the 
BETA OMICRON Chapter of the SIGMA NU FRATERNITY 
at the University of South, Sewanee, Tennessee. 
3. The remaining funds received from the Ferguson 
Capital Account should be divided equally 
between Betsy Cheney of Lake City Colorado and 
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., of Santa Rosa, 
California. 
C. All race horse related livestock and vehicles shall 
be given to Don Randall. 
D. All other livestock and saddle horses shall be given 
i Pete Heaton. 
c• personal property should be divided as :ol*cv:.s; 
" II!'" Il M i l I I B II a < ' ":°.rr' Set and o 
4-10 shotgun. 
2. 'Phii d i s t r i b u t i o n of the remaining items uf 
p e i" s u 11» J 1 11 J. M i > o i 11 11 i 11 H I" P 11111 r in if"' 11i 11 "il" 
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton -. :J 
Jame~ ' m - ir 
FOURTH ..,:u^ .. 
Orton, t : ac* as my personal representative or :\\ ^statt 
- •
 J
 ^ r r *•**•* necessity r-f giving bon.. • :. 
f_ V i* ; t UIldt * * J u n O y -J _ fcj i o t; 
reiser, ne cannot or doe ,-eisona-
.*-•**
 !
 irnolnt Tamer ' -
pezsonai repiesoniati1. -
necessity ot giving oonc. 
M„ . . —i-ecrirn with the administration of my estate anc 
the excCuCiw., ^ i .,;-J:: herein <JUIII»»I LMI, I IIILU" 
Representat:vo ?: foilcwsI 
1. " ""TTi, succession, eo*'3to transfer - " ?c*y or 
,^.4-,, ^^ 4--» <_. . . __ , . a come Daui... ;_, L* : 
law or in respect to any property -:r interest passing unaer t m s , 
, i • '.t- IIAH i 1 nn H Testament '*' - ^ ^ I M ^ O •*? ^^rat^ for thf* 
purpose oi determining I in.' amount 
including .ny nun, payable as interest -*: penalty eecause or any 
-.r*- thereof, shalx 
be paid out of or charged against my Utah estate in the manner 
hereinabove provided, as if it were a debt and without 
apportionment. 
2. Dividends and distributions, whether ordinary or 
extraordinary, which are received upon securities of corporations 
or associations, including wasting asset for investment companies, 
shall be allocated to income principal as hereinafter set forth, 
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary: (1) If 
received in cash or if receivable in cash, at the option of the 
stockholder, to income; (2) If received in stock of the declarer 
of any class, to principal; (3) If received in any security or 
property, other than the foregoing, to income, to the extent 
charged against earnings of the declarer, whenever earned, and the 
balance to principal (4) Not withstanding the foregoing, if paid 
in whole or partial liquidation of the declarer, to principal. 
My Personal Representative shall have full discretion to 
resolve any dbubt concerning the application of the foregoing 
directions and to allocate, between income and principal, any 
receipt as to which provision is not herein made and their decision 
shall be conclusive against all persons interested in my estate or 
in any trust created hereunder, 
3. In case any Personal Representative or trustees shall 
invest in any bonds or similar securities and shall pay therefor 
a premium in addition to the par value thereof, they may but shall 
not be required to, provide a sinking fund, from the income of such 
investments, to absorb such premium for the benefit of the 
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remaindermen h*:t, i~ '•"he case ~i any such security juquliwil i 
purchased l>-.--* -m .• a • " .y I.he fact or par value 
the. - -purities issued, or cusromari I 
bougnt sna .oia .... . -*scoun: ^uJis, such executors ox 
shall v1- :r^at an" - m /:t anv crcfit realized upon the sale c 
SIXTH: .:vt .:.. , ,.-,,. ath to ^V son, .,_*_ 
JR, ibsolu^ly :-' ~e -'irvives articles person-' 
houi . 
.~y ..tan estate at, my aeatn. ^w.uuiaj only such oi L-W*.-.,O .^. . «" 
mnchin^r- "y ^'iipmerr ;t ».ih noises and other 
-.ivestou. 
.tributed pursuant * : the provisions : \rticle THIR 
SEVEN" * erpb" direct: rr.y Personal Representative to borrc, 
whatever sums are necessary :cr tne . .axntendnct
 tpKeep ana 
trrase?'"**:- <— ^- - :-•-* in Virgin, '.tar. .:n<; i_.c -::u salaries oi 
r/f time *.•::!'.". snal - oe left to the sole discreatiun or r^ persona. 
representat *<-. '* ;• M -- borrowed against the real propert 
properr\ uuthonze IT? 1-ersoi.a" representative , :-t,L- u~ a ; ec 
rropertT- -^v^r- angible personal .,-; : : :> 
pursuant r: Articles 'I'HI^ D and SIXTH hereoi. j.:n time or twines 
ana upuii ouun uerms and conditions as s:*a*I uee«i advisable and to 
add the proceeds of any sucn sale "to my estate. 
EIGHTH: This will shall be probated subject to the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
NINTH: I make no provision herein for my ex-wife, Donna Lynn 
Scarritt, for reasons well known to her. I make no provision for 
my son, Ryan Winthrop Scarritt, for the reason that he will be 
well-provided for, following my death, under the will of my father, 
Horace S. Scarritt. 
TENTH: I request my Utah Personal Representative to consult 
with and be guided by the advice of my friends of THE PARK FIRM, 
in the selection and distribution of my real and personal property. 
I, Curtiss S. Scarritt, the Testatrix, siga my name to this 
instrument this £°l day of MA, \J t 1991, and being first duly 
sworn, do declare to the undersigned authority that I sign and 
execute this instrument as my Last Will and Testament, and that I 
sign it willingly, that I executed it as my free and voluntary act, 
for the purposes expressed in it, and that I am eighteen years of 
age or older, of sound mind and under no constraint or undue 
influence• 
tj 
CURTISS S. SCARRITT 
We, L^qfr* ThmnpSCr/) and LtCil Lts . the witnesses, sign 
our names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby 
declare to the undersigned authority that the Testatrix signs and 
executes this instrument* as his Last Will and Testament, that he 
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SUBSCRIBED AND ; w w« i hoforo I <///#\ jA/ZP/&PLs and 
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